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Warwick Tie
THE NEOLIBERAL REFORMS of the 1980s produced, go-ing into the new millennium, a contradiction within capi-talism that is illuminated by the unprecedented popularity 
of John Key as Prime Minister. As highlighted by Italian Marxist 
Maurizio Lazzarato, this contradiction concerns an impasse in 
political economy that develops as a consequence of capital’s in-
ability to create experiences of self – subjectivities – required for 
its own reproduction.1 In short, the contradiction signals a crisis 
in the social reproduction of capital, a crisis in the reproduction 
of capitalist subjectivity. The requirement upon people to become 
1  Maurizio Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, Los Angeles 2014.
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‘entrepreneurs of the self’ or units of self-actuating ‘human capi-
tal’ produces insufficiently coherent experiences of selfhood, ac-
companied by a widespread development of compensatory states 
of narcissistic grandiosity.2 Different social formations produce 
particular kinds of subjectivity, and come to privilege specific 
public figures as ideals of the psychological traits favourable to 
the efficient operation of the prevailing social order. That order, 
in our case, is neoliberal capital of an increasingly authoritarian 
populist kind, and Key exemplifies its ideal subject. Resistance 
to the logics by which a given social order is functioning turns, in 
part, upon the dislocation of its central figures. Against the indi-
vidualistic contentedness projected by the figure of Key, a need 
arises to imagine how a collective, cooperative, subject might form 
anew in this situation. This essay will move towards Jodi Dean’s 
discussion of the party form to think through what such a project 
might entail.3
 The figure of Key emerges as both a symptom of capi-
talism’s crisis of social reproduction and, via the internal con-
tradictions of that figure, a pathway beyond the predicament. 
With regard to Key being a symptom of the situation, the ‘mass 
personification’ of institutional politics, as initially identified by 
Perry Anderson with respect to Berlusconi in Italy,4 provides in-
sight into the function his persona plays for contemporary capi-
tal. The mass personification of which Anderson speaks refers to 
the reduction, through the mediatised character of contemporary 
public communication, of political competence to demonstrations 
2  See Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, New York 1979; Lynne Layton, 
Grandiosity, neoliberalism, and neoconservatism, Psychoanalytic Inquiry: A Topical 
Journal for Medical Health Professionals, 34/5, 2014; Martjin Konings, (2014) Finan-
cial affect, Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory, 15/5, 2014; Slavoj 
Žižek ‘Pathological Narcissus as a socially mandated form of subjectivity, accessed 
May 4 2016, http://mariborchan.si/text/articles/slavoj-zizek/pathological-narcissus-as-
a-socially-mandatory-form-of subjectivity.
3  Jodi Dean, Crowds and Party, London and New York 2016. Henceforward CP.
4  Perry Anderson, The Italian disaster, London Review of Books, 36/10, 2014.
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of personality via the production of video-blogs, publicity stunts, 
biographies, and the like. This reduction of politics to the banal 
psychologism of personality enables the figure of Key to function 
as a ‘Mr Kiwi Everybloke’ who melds with chameleon-like ability 
into each and every situation in which he is inserted, 5 providing 
the perfect ‘antidote to the climate of crisis’6 – and for whom the 
audience is less the people of Aotearoa than international finance 
markets7 – the effect of which is a muting of messages by which 
truth could be told about the destructive effects of the policy fail-
ures associated with those reforms.8 The local mass personifica-
tion of politics, as exemplified in the political leverage offered by 
the elasticity of ‘John Key’, occludes domestic recognition of any 
such crisis in the social reproduction of capital.
 The focus of this piece falls on the second dimension of 
Key’s appearance in this conjuncture: on the figure of Key as a 
site of potentially fruitful political contradiction. The kernel to 
that contradiction lies with the cognitive operating system that 
Key claims as his own and from which seemingly flows his op-
timistic demeanour: pragmatism. Reminiscent of the hope that 
a sufficient length of No. 8 wire should resolve most issues fac-
ing a settler society, pragmatism plugs into a feature of subjec-
tivisation that left wing appeals to political principles and moral 
values seemingly fail to grasp. Within societies where ideas cir-
culate primarily through the mass media, a generalised ‘decline 
of symbolic efficiency’ has occurred, suggests Slavoj Žižek.9 Prin-
ciples and values cannot be relied upon to ground thoughts and 
5  Vijay Devadas & Brett Nicholls, The meaning of John Key, New Zealand Journal 
of Media Studies, 13/2, 2012, p. 21.
6  Ibid., p. 23.
7 John Key and the Spirit of His Times, Political Organisation Aotearoa http://poa.
org.nz/John%20Key%20and%20the%20Spirit%20of%20his%20Times.pdf.
8  Campbell Jones, John Key the biofinancial entrepreneur, Kōtuitui New Zealand 
Journal of Social Sciences Online, 11/2, 2016.
9  Slavoj Žižek, cited in CP, p. 21.
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actions. As a consequence of this decrease in the gravitational 
pull of big ideas, people’s senses of self increasingly form through 
the affective, rather than cognitive, proprieties of language.10 Of 
increasing significance for the smooth functioning of late capital, 
in this regard, has been a form of desire that exists for its own 
sake. Politics becomes, in part, a contest over the ends to which 
desire of that rootless kind can be put. In the minds of Deleuze 
and Guatarri, such an experience of desire has migrated in from 
the outer reaches of psychical life to become ‘part of the infra-
structure’ of capital itself. 11 One specific form of this desire shall 
hold our attention below, as it emerges from within the pragma-
tism of Key: a state of simultaneous belief and non-belief towards 
ideas, principles, and values (a state of ‘disavowal’). 
 It remains an open question as to whether the optimism 
conveyed by the pragmatism of Key will suffice to meet the chal-
lenge of an increasingly indebted middle class.12 Neither is it 
clear if and when his pragmatism will begin to rub salt into the 
wounds of those whose capacities to ‘get ahead’ are being incre-
mentally moved to a minority investor class,13 or of those who 
recognise the erosion underway of the institutions central to 
their democratic freedoms, of law and the public service.14 
 What can be mapped, however, is the apparent extension 
of the crisis to the production of subjectivities on the Left, wheth-
er of radical or progressive kinds. Neither the subject positions 
associated with vanguard politics nor the proliferation of causes 
under the banners of nationalist populism, environmentalism or 
10  Gilles Deleuze & Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, Athlone 1984. Henceforward A-O.
11  Felix Guattari, cited in Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, p. 7.
12  Between the early 1990s to the present, for example, ratios of household debt 
relative to nominal disposable income have risen from 58% to over 160%. See ‘House-
hold debt’, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, accessed January 14 2016, http://www.
rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/ key_graphs/household_debt/.
13  Max Rashbrooke, Wealth and New Zealand, Wellington 2015.
14  Margaret Wilson, The Struggle for Sovereignty, Wellington 2015.
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of identity politics, resolve that crisis. Neither of these forms of 
subjectivity show themselves able to inaugurate a break within 
the prevailing patterns of socio-economic causality; nor can they 
seemingly envisage how, out of any such break, future possible 
alternatives might be crafted.
 It is to the possibility of alternative subjectivities and 
their production that we turn. Our starting point for this exer-
cise is the pragmatism for which the figure of Key has become 
synonymous.
The Practitioner of Pragmatism
Pragmatist thought has long viewed the world of ideas as run-
ning askew to the rationality by which logic is often assumed to 
operate. ‘Every new concept first comes to mind in a judgment’, 
Charles Saunders Peirce noted emblematically in this regard.15 
Contextualising the agnosticism which pragmatic thought dis-
plays towards rationality, the work of Deleuze and Guattari 
suggests that pragmatism belongs to the world of ‘desiring-ma-
chines’: to a mode of production in which ‘everything functions at 
the same time, but amid hiatuses and ruptures … within a sum 
that never succeeds in bringing its various parts together so as 
to form a whole’.16 In the absence of knowable end points (the 
‘sum’), this concept suggests, desire forms towards projects and 
programmes that assume the existence of such points without 
ever having to claim direct knowledge. Desire comes to function 
at the level of ‘what works’. 
15  Charles Saunders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Volumes V 
and VI, Pragmatism and Pragmaticism and Scientific Metaphysics, Cambridge MA 
1934, p. 385.
16  A-O, p. 42.
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 Ironically, as Deleuze and Guattari note, the networks 
of projects and plans that comprise desiring-machines func-
tion not by fulfilling the grand intentions inferred of them but, 
rather, through their state of continually breaking down: ‘That 
is because the breaks in the process are productive, and are re-
assemblies in and of themselves’.17 The fact that a given project 
might head off in a new direction as a consequence of its inter-
ruption by a programme of a different kind merely attests to the 
productivity of contemporary production. As Lazzarato adds, an 
associated stripping of desire from idealised outcomes produces a 
mode of political calculation no longer capable of exercising criti-
cal concern toward the material reality in which calculation itself 
functions. Instead, planning becomes that ‘of the possible, of the 
creation of new potentialities, of the emergence of what appears 
possible within the framework of capitalist domination’.18
 ‘I’ve always been a glass half-full as opposed to a glass 
half-empty’, Key has remarked in a gesture towards this produc-
tive state of incompleteness, ‘and the day that changes is the 
day I should leave’.19 Politics would have no allure, this cliché-
laden statement suggests, if desire were to adopt more than an 
agnostic stance toward the material totality (‘the sum’) in which 
it operates. Of greater significance, then, than the big ideas and 
visions in which political thought might engage individuals in 
the consummation of their desires, is pragmatism’s capacity to 
ceaselessly produce desire unsullied by matters of substance.
 Pragmatism’s potential for the endless generation of de-
sire lies with the relationship between the regulatory ideals by 
which political communities configure themselves (democratic 
equality, rule of law, and so on) and the network of behavioural 
17  Ibid.,p. 42.
18  Maurizio Lazzarato, Signs and Machines, p. 51.
19  http://m.imdb.com/name/nm3658941/quotes.
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relations by which those ideals gain tractive force. Peirce, again: 
A quality is something capable of being completely embodied. A 
law never can be embodied in its character as a law except by 
determining a habit. A quality is how something may or might 
have been. A law is how an endless future must continue to be.20 
 The materialization of a community’s regulatory ideals 
(like order) into concrete objects (like law) occurs only via the 
circuits of interaction that bind its members (‘habit’). Gesturing, 
also, to the significance which networks of circulation play in the 
constitution of ideas, Key observes of his own work practices: 
It’s possible to spend every waking hour here on the ninth floor and 
not get out of the office. And this isn’t the real world in here. And 
contrary to public opinion, I’m not incredibly poll-driven. They are 
an ongoing indicator of how we are going, but I take the feedback I 
get on the street as the most important.21
Understood through the logics of pragmatism, the empirical 
objects to which the concepts of ‘democracy’, ‘law’ etc. point are 
thereby seen not to exist ‘as such’. Take the example of money:22 a 
pragmatist quite understands that no material equivalent exists 
for a coin or dollar note. They will be comfortable that the Gov-
ernor of the Reserve Bank would indicate the value of their $20 
note by presenting them with another $20 note. The pragmatist 
also understands, however, that the absence of intrinsic value 
does not stop money from producing concrete material effects as 
it circulates. It both ‘is’ and ‘is not’. This same phenomenon of 
splitting characterises John Key’s interpretation of ‘economy’: 
I think it is only natural that people have anxiety about the economy 
because the economy is real. It is their job, their ability to service 
their mortgage and look after their family. And in the final analysis, 
20  Charles Saunders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Saunders Peirce, p. 103.
21  http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/j/john_key_2.html.
22  See Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology, London and New York 1989, pp. 
18-19. Henceforward SOI.
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nothing is more important than your capacity as a breadwinner or 
an earner to provide for those that rely on you.23
The economy simply ‘is’: it is ‘real’. Simultaneously, it is no one 
thing in particular (a job; a source of mortgage payments; a 
means of household consumption; the list could go on …). Moreo-
ver, the surest sign that no substantive content underpins the 
range of the economy’s appearances comes from the moral regis-
ter (as opposed to analytic or diagnostic) in which Key delivers 
his concluding point: ‘in the final analysis …’ there is no analysis 
to be had about the meaning of economy, only a shared prac-
tice of moralising talk (‘nothing is more important …’) towards a 
point of reference merely presumed to exist. As the Scandinavian 
scholar of political economy, Martjin Konings, observes in gen-
eral of pragmatic analyses of the ‘economy’: 
The economy is not a discrete method or an easily wielded instru-
ment of control, but refers to the semiotic dynamic whereby we be-
come invested in the sign and internalize a particular relation to 
the unobservable.24
As recognised by the early American proponents of pragmatism, 
and re-emphasised in Konings’ summation, the simultaneous 
existence and non-existence of social objects propels the subject 
into states of affective attachment. Perhaps unexpectedly, for 
the principled Left at least, the practitioners of pragmatism do 
not invest in the big ideas of modernity:  democracy, law, exper-
tise, and so on. The symbolic efficiency of big ideas, as noted, has 
been on the decline. Rather, the attachment is toward the social 
networks by which semblances of those ideas are designed, pro-
duced, and traded. A quotation oft-times cited from the American 
pragmatist William James, a contemporary of Peirce, anticipates 
this condition. James suggests that big ideas arrest the imagina-
tion not because of the manner in which they seemingly express 
23  http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/j/john_key_2.html.
24  Martjin Konings, The Emotional Logic of Capitalism, Redwood City 2015, p. 52.
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timeless truths. Rather, their social efficiency turns upon the de-
gree to which people invest themselves in the networks of social 
relationships within which those big ideas are circulating:
I am done with great things and big things, great institutions and 
big success, and I am for those tiny, invisible molecular moral forces 
that work from individual to individual, creeping through the cran-
nies of the world like so many rootlets, or like the capillary oozing of 
water, yet which if you give them time, will rend the hardest monu-
ments of man’s pride. 
Gone are hopes of accessing the ‘big’ and ‘great’ things of modern 
life (‘I am done with …’) and, instead, desire emerges for par-
ticipation in (‘I am for …’) the circulation of the semblances by 
which those objects come to exist. Such is the systemic kernel of 
pragmatism as a desiring-machine of late capitalism. A message 
by Key to the public regarding the 2008 global financial recession 
illustrates this point:
We don’t tell New Zealanders we can stop the global recession, be-
cause we can’t. What we do tell them is we can use this time to 
transform the economy to make us stronger so that when the world 
starts growing again we can be running faster than other countries 
we compete with.25
Key’s view of the economy is thereby characterised by simultane-
ous visions of inevitable growth (‘when the world starts growing 
again’) and recession (a recession ‘we can’t stop’). In the face of 
the deadlock between those images, the pathway of desire (‘we 
will be running faster’) is toward enhanced levels of practical 
participation in the existing networks of capitalist organisation 
(‘we can use this time to transform the economy’).
 As a desiring-machine, pragmatism shakes the rational 
ground upon which critical analysis frequently announces itself. 
Radical criticism, as oft-times occurs in the principled names of 
egalitarianism, fairness, justice, and so on, is easily recoded in 
25  http://m.imdb.com/name/nm3658941/quotes.
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keeping with pragmatist desire. Proponents of neoliberalism can 
just as easily talk of (child) poverty reduction,26 social fairness,27 
justice,28 and so on. From the viewpoint of pragmatic governance, 
the points of principle upon which the Left might criticise neo-
liberal reforms are but objects that move in keeping with shifts 
in the language games of political contestation. As seriously as 
such principles need to be taken publically by those who govern, 
the pragmatist would also say that the state of seriousness need 
only be lightly held. Note the tacit qualification, in this regard, 
of Key’s assessment as to the socio-political significance of the 
global fight against inequality: ‘We live in a world where equality 
is pretty important’.29
 A still greater challenge awaits radical critique, however. 
If it were to succeed in prompting popular criticism of neoliber-
alism, progressive thought would be at risk of presenting itself 
as being other than a desiring-machine. Emblematic here are 
the attempts in the last electoral campaigns of Labour and the 
Greens alike to present sets of well-reasoned policies, to coun-
ter the relative lack of policy detail with which National cam-
paigned. In comparison to the seemingly open-ended capacity of 
pragmatism to generate raw desire in and of itself, the kinds of 
desire on offer from the centralist Left appear to be all too tightly 
prescribed (if not archaic to the ears of the contemporary New 
Zealanders) – these being principles of fairness, justice, equality, 
and so on.
 A difficult political challenge thereby emerges in this 
situation for radical thought. It must successfully criticise the 
26  See, for example, Budget will contain measures to tackle poverty New Zealand, 
The New Zealand Herald, May 15 2013.
27  See, for example, Audrey Young, Govt insists fairness at heart of Pike River 
compensation denial, The New Zealand Herald, November 21 2013.
28  See, for example, Todd McClay, NZ deeply disappointed by whaling decision, 
Scoop, accessed December 2 2015, http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA1511/S00541/nz-
deeply-disappointed-by-whaling-decision.htm.
29  http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/j/john_key.html.
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naturalness attributed to pragmatic thought while, nevertheless, 
co-opting the optimistic open-endedness which pragmatism pro-
jects. 
 The seeds for productive responses sit within that sim-
ple dialectical observation, noted earlier, that Deleuze and Guat-
tari make of desiring-machines: such apparatuses function not 
by working but, rather, by ‘being in a state of breaking down’.30 
Each and every desiring-machine exists to the extent to which 
their points of internal rupture produce forms of subjectivity that 
can create new ways by which to experience desire. This insight 
suggests that it might thereby become possible to reach beyond 
neoliberal pragmatism through itself, to identify new forms of 
political subjectivity latent within its internal antagonisms.
 Two associated tasks emerge in this process of critique: 
the identification of points at which the desiring-machine of 
pragmatism is presently breaking down; and the redirection of 
those forces toward collective ends. As with the novel by Milan 
Kundera from which this paper borrows its title,31 a pivotal ques-
tion becomes how a subjectivity oriented toward the pursuit of 
seemingly ceaseless multiplicity (in politics, as in sexual rela-
tions) might morph through the internal dislocation of its own 
practices of thought, into experiences of the self that expand in 
relation to the world held in common.
Pragmatism as the Practice of Disavowal
Characteristic of the pragmatism of neoliberal governance is the 
apparent inability of its subjects to acknowledge the constitutive 
role played within their thought by the psychodynamic phenom-
enon of disavowal. Disavowal is the Freudian term for a state of 
30  A-O, p. 8.
31   Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being, London 1984.
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simultaneous belief and non-belief. We could think of it, in ver-
nacular terms, as our propensity to lie to ourselves. 
 This dynamic can be explained in terms of the psychi-
cal structure that Jacques Lacan called ‘perversion’.32 Perversion 
does not refer, as the name might imply, to a refusal of hetero-nor-
mative sexuality (notwithstanding Lacan’s use of homosexuality 
to illustrate the phenomenon). Rather, perversion is a discursive 
structure that prevents objects from gaining tractive force within 
the symbolic order. In the case of disavowal, that structure is a 
point between belief and non-belief. It is a site within, and about, 
which words cannot form. With regard to Key’s description of 
‘economy’, for example, the point at which he passes from stating 
that it ‘is real’ to the point in which his words demonstrate it does 
not exist in the manner just stated, cannot itself be expressed.
 As a consequence of the perverse structure of disavowal, 
the phenomenon necessarily remains in a state of repression. It 
cannot be brought to mind. One effect of this is that decision-
making processes that pivot upon the practice of disavowal ap-
pear as absolutely natural, as being philosophically inconsequen-
tial, if not politically neutral. ‘There is nothing going on here … 
move on …’.
 A particular class of object is set in motion by the op-
eration of disavowal: fantasy. Fantasy binds human organs with 
thought, being the discursive mechanism by which ideas come to 
exert something akin to a gravitational force upon the mind. As 
Žižek notes, the most functional of all fantasies within the socie-
ties of late modernity is the seemingly innocuous phrase ‘as if’. 
With regard to the operation of the capitalist economy, for exam-
ple, 
32  See Jacques Lacan, The Seminar. Book 1. Freud’s Papers on Technique, 1953-54, 
Cambridge 1988, p. 221.
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individuals proceed as if the commodity is not submitted to physi-
cal, material exchanges; as if it is excluded from the natural cycle of 
generation and corruption; although on the level of their ‘conscious-
ness’ they ‘know very well’ that this is not the case.33 
The phrase ‘as if’ occupies the place of what is otherwise the im-
penetrable kernel of disavowal. Its use should be read as being 
no less than a political practice. Where an idea comes to be pre-
sented ‘as if’ being true, semblances of the referent to which that 
idea points can begin to circulate and to accrue social power. 
 John Key’s statement on ‘the economy’ again exemplifies 
this latter set of points regarding the role of fantasy within disa-
vowal: notwithstanding the inability of Key’s description to ac-
count in any reasonable way for the existence of ‘the economy’, it 
is enough that the economy is ‘as if’ real for it to be talked about 
in the concrete terms implied by his statement (‘it is real! [even 
though my reference to it as a list of attributes will disclose that 
it is anything but] …’).
 The significance of fantasy extends also into the constitu-
tion of neoliberal subjectivity. The psychical instability induced 
by states of simultaneous belief and non-belief, by the operation 
of the fantasmatic ‘as if’, is accompanied by compensatory states 
of narcissism. Typifying that narcissism is a psychical condition 
of ‘splitting’. Psychotherapist Lynne Layton describes that split-
ting as a persistent oscillation within people between ‘grandios-
ity and self-deprecation’.34 Delusions of grandeur and depression 
become discomforting companions. Sustaining the formation of 
such psychical states, Layton posits, is the nuclear family as fet-
ishized under neoliberal conditions – in which ‘anxieties about 
class mobility’ flourish amidst a persistent belief that individuals 
must inevitably prosper – and public policy, where ‘social prob-
33  SOI, p. 18. Original emphasis.
34  Lynne Layton, Grandiosity, neoliberalism, and neoconservatism, p. 463.
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lems are reconceptualised as individual problems that market 
forces such as privitization and consumer products can solve’.35 
Under such conditions, ‘paradoxical psychological states of too 
much responsibility (for the self) and too little (for the common 
good) ensue’.36 To reframe Layton’s observations in the terms of 
the dynamics of disavowal, it is as if a (non-existent) collective 
end exists under neoliberal conditions, in respect of which the 
subject must be made personally responsible. 
 Subjectivity stumbles under the dislocating effects of 
that disavowal. Not only does this psychological fragility play out 
in the clinic but also in political culture. Layton observes this 
brittleness forming, for example, in and around the grandiosity 
with which her fellow Americans can perceive the place of their 
country in the world: ‘The need to be #1 only increases when peo-
ple become, at some level, aware that they are anything but #1 
– and cannot speak about that awareness’.37  
 In a similar vein, Konings observes that disavowal re-
sults also in a knotting of subjectivity around sets of ‘paradoxical 
strange loop(s)’,38 and ‘wounded attachments’.39 This is, Konings 
observes, ‘the paradoxical way in which moderns use their re-
flective capacities to sustain forces that injure them’.40 Emblem-
atic of such narcissism since the 1980s has been the subject’s 
‘anxiety-driven integration into disciplinary mechanisms of 
credit and debt in a context of stagnant wage growth and rising 
unemployment’.41 The very model of economy which depletes the 
subject’s well-being becomes the mechanism to which the subject 
looks for remedy. 
35  Ibid., p. 468.
36  Ibid., p. 469.
37  Ibid., 471.
38  Martjin Konings, Financial affect, p. 48.
39  Martjin Konings citing Brown 1995, in Financial affect, p. 43.
40  Konings, The Emotional Logic of Capitalism, p. 7.
41  Ibid., p. 107.
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Responses to Disavowal
A small set of subjectivities has emerged in the Left seemingly 
capable of challenging the socio-political effects of neoliberal dis-
avowal. These are exemplified, on the one hand, by attachments 
to political principles and social values whose mere articulation 
is anticipated to garner commitment. On the other, attachments 
form to the epiphenomenal aspects of political life – such as the 
particularism of identities – in an apparent anticipation that the 
recognition of difference holds the key to progressive politics. 
 Viewed from the lens of Hegelian dialectics, both subject 
positions are but moments in an interpretive lens of ‘determinate 
reflection’.42 The development of political subjectivities in either 
manner (in Hegel’s terms, from the interpretive practices of ‘pos-
iting reflection’ and of ‘external reflection’), can only progress 
to the extent to which those approaches also participate in the 
practice of disavowal. To this end, success in the act of applying 
political principles or values, or of refusing on the particularis-
tic grounds of identity-politics, implies a binding of subjectivity 
to the same systematised state of self-deception as characterises 
the pragmatism of Key. The act of engaging with such stand-
points more seriously than their advocates becomes the means by 
which disavowal may, instead, be dislodged from within progres-
sive analysis. How so?
 The use of ‘positing reflection’ to envision alternative 
economic systems and socio-political relations, as occurs through 
appeals to first- principles and core-values, assumes that such 
alternatives are readily accessible to experience. Such values or 
principles ‘speak for themselves’ as a consequence of being as-
serted. The National Government’s assertion as to the forthcom-
ing availability of technological fixes for climate change illus-
trates the phenomenon.43 
42  See SOI, pp. 201-32.
43  See, for example, Oliva Wahhan, Waiting for climate change action, The Domin-
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 The rhetorical force of projects produced through the prac-
tice of reflective positing does not turn, as might be anticipated, 
upon the strengths of their proposals for future alternatives. Such 
programmes of reform might indeed appear to connect the idea 
of principled vision with concrete planning for future states. We 
need only, however, consider the limited detail available on ‘anti-
capitalist’ futures, or of ‘technological fixes to climate change’, to 
realise the imaginary impulses at work here. In the absence of 
such detail, a subjectivity that functions through the simple as-
sertion of ideas is liable to become enmeshed in disavowal. Such 
individuals are likely to believe themselves capable of speaking 
at length about alternative futures given the strength of their 
critiques of the present, but are actually only able to believe in 
(to never move beyond) the act of critique.44 All too often, the re-
sponse to this impasse is a mounting of hysterical tirades against 
those who do not believe in the same way.
 The pathway towards alternative subjectivities lays, for 
Žižek, with the act of taking seriously the deep assumptions be-
ing made in the act of asserting truths. Common to projects pro-
duced in this way is the presumption that the realm of represen-
tation exists prior to the language in which it occurs. Language is 
thereby assumed to simply perform a function somehow already 
given to it: to represent reality. Language does not simply repre-
sent reality, however. It has no given task. Myths and legends, 
for example, have social effects for their participants even though 
the stories do not correspond with the known world. Ironically, 
this is a point which pragmatism seemingly accepts about truth-
claims.  When pushed to its logical conclusion, however, this 
assumption indicates that all truth-claims are always already 
ion Post, 30 March 2015; Bold climate change target, The Timaru Herald, 13 July 
2015.
44  See also Alenka Zupančič, When Surplus Enjoyment Meets Surplus Value, in 
Justin Clemens and Russell Griggs, eds., Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of Enjoy-
ment, Durham and London 2006, pp. 155-178.
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(mere) representations, that all claims about the nature of the 
world are inflected by a range of political and ethical commit-
ments. At those points where Key might assert that ‘the econo-
my’ is indeed ‘real’, the radical Left would be advised to point out 
that the vitality of such a foundational idea in neoliberal thought 
depends very much upon its ongoing ability to resonate with the 
deep investments of the (conservative) communities through 
which it circulates. There is nothing natural about it at all. To 
reframe the point, the radical Left needs to become even more se-
rious about the tenets of pragmatism than the pragmatist would 
dare: no truth-claims whatsoever escape the mediating effects of 
the cultures in which they appear.
 In taking seriously the central presupposition of reflec-
tive positing, analysis opens onto a state of ‘external reflection’.45 
We are getting closer here to the preferred terrain of leftist po-
litical thought: that there exists an ultimate good towards which 
collective action might struggle. External reflection acknowledg-
es that practices of understanding are always contingent upon 
a diversity of socio-cultural conditions, such that interpretation 
is always mediated by a range of socially stratified experiences, 
philosophical commitments, culturally mandated authorities 
and so on. It acknowledges that all truth-claims are indeed mere 
representations. The ‘externality’ of this reflective mode lies with 
the manner in which the interpretive act thereafter assumes the 
existence of a point lying beyond the field of representation; that 
is, a point in which resides the truth of that field’s interpretive 
fragmentation. External reflection, Žižek notes, ‘transposes the 
“essence”, the “true meaning” … [of a text/event/object] … into 
the unattainable beyond, making of it a transcendent “Thing-in-
itself”’.46 For the Left, the prospect of an anti-capitalist future 
frequently appears in this mode: it appears as a site that exists 
45  SOI, pp. 224-5.
46  Ibid., p. 213.
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independently of the cultural traditions, identities, and desires 
within whose ambit it is being imagined. For Key, similarly, ‘the 
economy’ appears in this same way, unsullied by traditions, his-
tories, and psychical investments. To speak of ‘the economy’ or 
‘the anti-capitalist future’, in this manner, risks delusion. 
 As with the practice of reflective positing, the subjectivity 
at work in the enacting of external reflection can be moved be-
yond through an act of taking more seriously than its proponents 
the underlying presupposition of the practice. This applies to left 
wing critics as much as to neoliberal pragmatists. The point that 
is to be taken more seriously than its advocates might bear is the 
externalist proposition that there indeed exists something (an ‘es-
sence’) beyond the field of appearances. Reality indisputably ex-
ists. Moreover, it is singular and material in form. In light of that 
proposition, the appearances by which the essence of an object 
manifests are never sufficient to express that reality. The ongo-
ing failures of economic interventions with the Global Financial 
Crises – of both the fiscal kind (Keynesian-type government in-
vestment) and monetary form (austerity) – illustrate this point: 
although the two encompass the entire range of possible capital-
ist responses to the economic crisis, neither prove able to suture 
the sundered field, to reform ‘the economy’. In the same way, the 
array of identity-based, ecological and peace social movements 
that comprise the contemporary field of counterhegemonic poli-
tics never tells us what ‘the political’ is. Notwithstanding hopes 
that they might coalesce into a ‘beautiful moment’ of transforma-
tive political change,47 the time of such a moment appears unim-
aginable.
 To this proposition, the insight can be added that ‘this “es-
sence” is nothing but the inadequacy of the appearance to itself’.48 
47  CP, pp. 125-6.
48  SOI, p. 206. Original emphasis.
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What might this dense statement from Žižek mean? The Thing 
(the ‘essence’; ‘the economy’ or ‘the political’ for ‘example) exists 
in a state of internal inconsistency (split between itself as a refer-
ent and the cultural appearances it takes within specific commu-
nities). Moreover, the field of appearances by which that referent 
comes to exist ‘amongst us’ (of markets or political campaigns, for 
example, as a fabricated field of objects and processes by which 
particular groups might pursue freedoms) is also ruptured from 
within. Contradictions pepper that field of appearances (as be-
tween, in a low-wage economy, competing demands for people to 
both actively consume and to take responsibility for the debt they 
thereby amass). The essence is no more than the inadequacy of 
attempts at its representation.
 A state of ‘absolute negativity’ thereafter envelops at-
tempts to represent big ideas and concrete projects formed to-
wards their realisation.49 Ideals can thereafter no longer be 
imagined to reside in a cocooning ‘beyond’ awaiting their enact-
ment while, similarly, concrete forms cannot be imagined inde-
pendently of the socio-cultural processes within which they are 
compromisingly situated. 
 A Lacanian insight becomes important at this stage so 
as to prevent this state of ‘absolute negativity’ from plunging 
political analysis back into the sinkholes of ambivalence and 
self-deception that characterise disavowal. The condition of ab-
solute negativity does not result in subjectivity finding itself 
paralysed because anything that is asserted must also be denied. 
Rather, Lacanian analysis draws attention to the role played at 
such points by emergent signifiers of lack.50 These are a class 
of signs whose relations with reality remain so indistinct that 
they can sustain a number of meanings being generated out of 
49  Ibid.
50  Ibid., pp. 220-4.
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them. Žižek finds in Hegel a lead for understanding their role in 
enabling radically transformative change. The aspirational icons 
by which subjectivity might ordinarily find itself motivated – of 
Spirit, Self, State, God and so on – successfully circulate through 
social spaces to the extent to which those objects are in practice 
inflected by 
an object which, by its very inadequacy, ‘gives body’ to the absolute 
negativity of the Idea : ‘the Spirit is a bone’, ‘Wealth is the Self’, ‘the 
State is the Monarch’, ‘God is Christ’ …. the Spirit is the inert, dead 
skull, the subject’s Self is this small piece metal that I am holding 
in my hand, the State as the rational organization of social life is 
the idiotic body of the Monarch, God who created the world is Jesus, 
this miserable individual crucified together with two robbers …51
Ideas will not gain transformational traction, Žižek is suggest-
ing, simply as a consequence of being seen to be ‘the true nature 
of things’ (reflective positing) or ‘an unattainable ideal to which 
we must nevertheless aspire’ (external reflection). Rather, the 
symbolic efficiency of transformative ideas begins ‘in the fact that 
this very negativity, to attain its “being-for-itself”, must embody 
itself again in some miserable, radically contingent corporeal 
leftover’.52  It is by virtue of a class of banal elements that radical 
Left thought might begin to reconfigure the terrain of political 
contest. What might this mean?
 Between this domain of a ‘contingent leftover’ and the do-
main of the transcendent thing-in-itself sits a dialectical impasse 
– what Hegel called a state of ‘infinite judgment’.53 We can only 
access something as grand as the ‘the political’, for example, via 
campaigns and strategies limited by their respective times and 
places, knowing very well the impossibility of experiencing that 
ultimate state ‘in itself’ through participation in those events. 
51  Ibid., pp. 206-7. Original emphasis.
52  Ibid., p. 207. Emphasis added.
53  Ibid., pp. 206-7.
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The element to emerge in that state of infinite judgment is, in 
Lacan’s understanding, not simply another object but the subject 
itself. The subject is what emerges in the act of facing the impos-
sibility posed by the gap between the set of idealised objects to 
which communities are given to aspire (the ‘Thing-in-itself’) and 
the field of banal artefacts by which those elements take concrete 
form within the social. The specific content which subjectivity 
might thereafter accrue will depend upon whether the state of 
‘infinite judgment’ by which it is birthed is turned into something 
‘sensible’ (into a productive and responsible member of society 
complete with career, family, mortgage and cat) – or enabled in 
its impulses to exceed both what it is given to dream and the 
reductive forms by which such dreams are presented for its con-
sumption.
New Sites of Political Subjectivisation
In the context of a continuing state of neoliberal hegemony, one 
measure as to the political value of philosophical thought is the 
degree to which it can seed counterhegemonic ideological infra-
structure. To reframe the point in the terms of the present ar-
gument, a prevailing issue concerns how political organisation 
might function so as to displace both the disavowal of neoliberal 
pragmatism and the ‘positing’/‘externalising’ analyses of much 
left wing thought, so as to enable new political subjectivities to 
emerge. Gesturing towards the institutional form which Hegel’s 
‘determinate reflection’ might take in Aotearoa New Zealand is 
Jodi Dean’s widely discussed work Crowds and Party.54 A central 
tenet of her text is that radical politics needs to find a way of sus-
taining popular desires for social equality beyond their sporadic 
54  See Dylan Taylor, The Coming of the Communist Party, New Zealand Sociology, 
in press; and Mind the gap, Daphne Lawless accessed June 30 2016, https://fightback.
org.nz/?s=Dean.
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expression in mass protest events, in a manner which enables 
‘the people’ to emerge as a collective and transformative subject.55 
 At stake is the relationship between political organiza-
tion, the crowds of mass protest, and ‘the people’: ‘We need to 
be a party for the people in the crowd.’56 That relationship is an 
affective one, pivoting upon a set of psychodynamic processes of 
which transference is the key.57 In the terms of the present argu-
ment, it is the operation of transference around political events 
that becomes important here as a successor to the disavowal of 
neoliberal pragmatism. How might that work?
 A successful radical organization is one that can project 
back to the protesting crowds the desires for equality that are 
unconsciously expressed in mass action, suggests Dean, such 
that participants recognize the desires as being their own. In the 
process of that recognition, the participants stand to see them-
selves as belonging to a revolutionary group. That new collective 
subject – ‘the people’ – will function as a transformational force 
so long as political organization remains able to provide to them 
a transferential screen upon which their desires are projected.58  
 This unusual notion of a political party as ‘a transferen-
tial site’ can be understood from Althusser’s formulation of ideol-
ogy, upon which Dean draws. Althusser famously viewed ideology 
as ‘representing’ to individuals their ‘imagined relations’ to the 
‘real conditions’ of their existences. The significance of this start-
ing point for the present analysis lies with the manner in which 
that formulation resonates with Hegel’s determinate reflection. 
The subject’s ‘real’ conditions of existence can never be directly 
known. Rather, what the subject can recognise easily are the cul-
55  CP, p. 5.
56  Ibid., p. 265.
57  Ibid., pp. 183-90.
58  Ibid., p. 5.
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tural artifacts of that reality (the images, material objects, state-
ments and so on, attributed to that reality). Ideology becomes a 
mechanism through which those representations are then knit-
ted into coherent narratives such that the individual can imag-
ine a relationship existing between themselves and those ‘real 
conditions’ of their lives. At the level of the individual, ideology 
thereby functions as that ‘transferential screen’: it reflects back 
to subjects what they already always desire―a dynamic relation 
they presume to exist with the real conditions of their lives. 
 Notwithstanding this starting point, Dean senses that 
Althusser’s formulation reinserts bourgeois individuality into 
the communist project: the subject of Althusser’s definition is, on 
the face of it, an individual.59  The act of rectifying this problem is 
central to the quest for a collective political organization that can 
replace the ego-centric contentedness of neoliberal thought. This 
apparent individualization of subjectivity in Althusser’s work 
can be fixed simply, for Dean, through an ‘inversion’ of his formu-
lation of ideology.60 The subject is always already ‘collective’, an 
unruly condition that stands ready to be released from a state of 
being ‘enclosed in [the bourgeois idea of] the individual’.61 
 In her analysis as to how the party might perform its 
difficult role of being a ‘transferential site’ for the desires of the 
crowd, Dean makes much of the practices that had characterized 
the local meetings of the twentieth century American and Brit-
ish communist parties: reporting on actions undertaken, shar-
ing new information, preparing written material and so on. Of 
most significance, in this regard, were the ‘trials’ through which 
59  At best, Dean’s position on Althusser is partial given that the text ‘Ideology 
and ideological state apparatuses’ overtly subverts any reading conducted from the 
subject-position of a coherent ego. Althusser appears to have been well aware of the 
problem Dean outlines.
60  Ibid, p. 74.
61  Ibid., p. 87.
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errant Party members were confronted with their actions. Such 
events crystalised the organisational issues associated with the 
corralling of unruly political desire. They were not without, as a 
consequence, their excesses:62 
The trial exposes the gap of desire as perhaps no other element 
of Party infrastructure can. Desire is never desire for a specific 
obtainable object― desire cannot be satisfied. Lacan’s famous dic-
tum is that “desire is the desire of the Other.” Desire opens up as 
a gap in the Other, as what the Other lacks. At times desire can 
become so overwhelming that it becomes concentrated in a singular 
place, such as a person imagined as a unified individual. The gap is 
filled in, the dream of justice truncated and distorted. Misdirected, 
thwarted back in on itself, desire becomes obscene.63 
The value of such practices, notwithstanding the apparent ex-
cesses with which they could be exercised, lay with how the dis-
cipline of the party came to be internalized by members, such 
that the boundary line blurred between subjectivity and party 
and the organization became the internalized dispositions of its 
members. Dean makes this point through the recounting of one 
comrade’s perspective on the unpopular task of selling the Com-
munist newspaper: 
because if I didn’t do it, I couldn’t face my comrades the next day …. 
They say to us, ‘The Communist Party held a whip over you.’ They 
don’t understand. The whip was inside each of us, we held it over 
ourselves, not each other. 64 
To be sure, Dean says, the exercise of Party authority can result 
in excesses that injure members. This is a risk, however, that 
must be accepted: 
The actuality of the Communist Party exceeds its errors and be-
trayals. It encompasses the hopes for justice and aspirations for 
equality invested in it. To reduce the Party to its excesses fails to 
62  Ibid., pp. 243-8.
63  Ibid., p. 247.
64  Ibid., p. 234.
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recognize its indispensable capacity to generate practical optimism 
and collective strength.65 
For those who support the rehabilitation of the party form, yet 
who sense in such a situation proto-religious processes akin to 
brainwashing, a difficult issue emerges. 66 In Althusser’s terms, 
the issue becomes one of how knowledge held in the party about 
the ‘state of affairs’ might avoid the emergence of strong posi-
tions whose doctrinaire form must be somehow simultaneously 
rejected, in order for that transferential relation between the 
party and ‘the people’ to remain. This matter concerns the psy-
chodynamic processes by which knowledge functions within po-
litical organisation. In the language of Lacan, the matter is one 
of sustaining the party in a state of being a ‘subject supposed to 
know’ rather than one that believes itself to know. 67 In the terms 
of determinate reflection, again, the task becomes that of sus-
taining the party’s knowledge in a state of ‘absolute negativity’ 
with regard to both people’s real conditions and the understand-
ing those individuals hold of their lives. The party cannot be al-
lowed to believe itself to know. 
 The significance of this matter is signaled in part when 
Dean muses on Lenin’s question as to what is to be done. ‘Too 
much’, is the reply; ‘the answer is always too much’.68 The state 
of excess need not simply mean here that there are always too 
many tasks for the bodies available. It can also mean that the 
situations within which tasks need be undertaken are always in 
a state of change. 
65  Ibid., p. 247.
66  See, for example, Daphne Lawless, Mind the gap.
67 CP, p. 187. The term subject-supposed-to-know was used by Lacan to describe the 
epistemological status of the analyst in the clinical setting. The analyst must be pre-
sumed by the one undertaking analysis, to ‘know’. Of course, the analyst can never 
have the knowledge of their client that is presumed of them. That state of knowing 
is simply, in functional terms, a fiction that is required in order for transference 
between client and analyst to begin.
68  Ibid., p. 239.
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 A further set of observations from Dean about the prac-
tices of those earlier communist gatherings becomes important 
here for understanding how the party form might avoid the 
temptation to exert mastery. The practice that Dean highlights 
is one of collective analysis. Local meetings would frequently be-
gin with members contributing from their various experiences to 
updates on current local and global events. This would function 
‘like a conversation among neighbors over a common problem. 
Anyone can speak. Underneath the informality, a deeper struc-
ture unfolds. Speakers describe the world situation …’.69 Such 
discussions would then frame the terms upon which the subse-
quent business of meetings would be conducted. 
The meeting connected the local, the immediate, with world-histor-
ical events …. Comrades drew strength from seeing themselves in a 
larger setting …. The particular was a bog …. Meetings broadened 
lives by opening them to the political, attaching them to movements 
and tendencies that took them out of miserable isolation. The world 
didn’t simply happen to them. They fought to shape the world.70
This simple act of iterative analysis had the effect of sustaining 
the groups in a state of openness to the real and evolving con-
ditions of their memberships. Each person thereby stood to see 
themselves in the course of the struggle against the prevailing 
logics of capitalist necessity. Rather than these members being 
subsumed by the party’s state of knowledge, they would each find 
themselves expanding into the experiences and insights of oth-
ers. Subjectivity would thereby become collective in a manner 
that had the potential to avoid the collapse of collectivity back 
into the singularity of a vanguard mentality. Rather, each indi-
vidual stood to enter a state of experiencing themselves as part 
of history’s ‘many’. 
69  Ibid., p. 243.
70  Ibid., p. 226.
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 In the language of Deleuze, political organisation that 
functions through practices of reiterative materialist analysis – 
of determinate reflection in other words – has the potential to 
produce desire without presuming knowledge of the object in re-
spect of which desire should function: the History which groups 
would recurrently narrate is one of their own making. The party 
form, as predicated upon such practices, can thereby succeed ne-
oliberal pragmatism as the dominant political desiring-machine.
The Situation Revisited
A contradiction emerges in capitalism as a legacy of neoliberal 
reforms, for which the figure of John Key is a symptom: a cri-
sis in the production of subjectivities capable of reproducing the 
logics of capital. Not only is Key a symptom of that crisis.  Con-
tradictions within the cognitive machinery by which his politi-
cal thought functions – pragmatism – also provide a platform 
for the production of new subjectivities. These are subjectivities 
capable of moving Aotearoa New Zealand beyond neoliberalism, 
as the prevailing hegemon increasingly exhibits traits of authori-
tarian populism. That shift involves a substitution of ‘desiring-
machines’: from the systematised self-deception of neoliberal 
pragmatism (‘disavowal’) to a kind of political analysis that can 
repeatedly form anew in the process of its use (‘determinate re-
flection’). Demonstrating how determinate reflection might pro-
duce political subjectivities capable of doing so and of keeping at 
bay the cossetting lure of disavowal – as reminiscent of the figure 
of Key – is the resurgent communist party form, an organisation 
offering a means (a ‘transferential screen’) by which participants 
in the crowds of mass protest might see their desires for equality 
projected. The central challenge of the party form is not, as might 
be anticipated in some quarters of the Left, to have it express the 
diversity of desires unleashed in mass protest. This would invoke 
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either the logic of reflective positing – and uncritical assertions 
as to the authenticity of those desires – or external reflection and 
its disavowal of the singularity of the social’s real conditions. 
Rather, the core challenge for the party as political project is of 
how it might remain open to those real conditions in their chang-
ing form, such that those who are drawn thus come to experience 
themselves as constitutive of that transformation.
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